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tual acquiescence of Jamaica and Barbados, smaller than Jamaica and Barbados. St. Kitts is about sixty-eight square miles, Nevis thirty-six. Altogether, the Leewards comprise 251 square miles compared to Jamaica's 4,411. These islands were especially dependent on the cultivation of sugar and on the domestic English sugar market for their exports.4 Their scattered white populations declined throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. Slaves outnumbered whites 12 to i in St. Kitts and 15 to I in Antigua-the highest proportions in British America. A regiment of troops, based in Antigua, could easily enforce British policy and suppress revolts among the small white populations of the Leewards. The main dockyard of the Royal Navy in British America was at English Harbor, Antigua. These conditions would lead us to expect the Leewards to have been more submissive than Barbados or Jamaica. Their resistance requires explanation.
The argument here attributes the more assertive response of the Leeward Islands to their closer ties to the mainland and especially to their greater vulnerability to economic pressure exerted by mainland merchants during the crisis of 1765-1766. In contrast, the other West Indian colonies were less dependent on mainland trade and therefore less susceptible to external pre sure. The administrative structure and the geography of the Leewards will also be shown to have facilitated their opposition. All the island colonies, includi Jamaica and Barbados, despite the apparent differences in their reactions, d liked the stamp tax. Nevertheless, the response of all the islands-even the Leewards-differed significantly from the mainland colonies. These differences later influenced the preferential treatment of the islands by Britain before the Revolutionary War. Finally, the response of the islands to the Stamp Act crisis anticipated their divergence from mainland colonies during the Revolutionary War.
The Stamp Act imposed a greater burden of taxation on the Caribbean than on the mainland colonies through clauses that specifically discriminated against the islands.5 These included a duty on "any probate of a will, letters of administration, or of guardianship for any estate above the value of twenty pounds"-double the rate for the mainland. The stamp duties on crown land grants were treble those levied on the mainland. Crown land grants below ioo the low proportion of slaves in the towns of the Leeward Islands, which again was also true of the towns of Barbados and Jamaica. She argues that the slaves of the Leeward Islands were more passive. Yet the I736 conspiracy in Antigua was unequaled in Barbados in the i8th century. She makes no reference to the friction with North America and the impact of the North American boycott. acres paid a 3s. duty in the Caribbean, necessitating the printing of a special stamp, in contrast to is. on the mainland. Public officials in the islands, but not on the mainland, paid a stamp duty on assuming offices worth over ?20 sterling per annum.6
Consequently, the British government allocated more stamps to the island colonies than to the mainland (relative to the size of the free population).
The greatest single consignment of stamps to British America, worth ?15,78i sterling, went to Jamaica, where the white population numbered under i8,ooo, in contrast to ?12,934 sterling sent to New York, where the white population was three and a half times larger. The government apportioned more stamps to the Leeward Islands than to any of the mainland colonies: it expected revenues from Antigua to be higher than from North Carolina or Maryland.7 The speaker of the assembly of Antigua speculated that total revenues from the Caribbean would be twice those of all the mainland colonies. Furthermore, the cost in the islands would fall almost entirely on trade and litigation rather than on the trifling volume of newspapers, books, pamphlets, and printed advertisements.8 Finally, the tax brought no positive benefits to the islands such as additional military protection.9 On the contrary, the ministry simultaneously reduced military garrisons in the older colonies (predating 1763) to the great dismay of the white population: the two army regiments in Jamaica were reduced from over two thousand to under a thousand men, and the regiment in Antigua fell from 700 to under 350 in 1764.10 Ministers did not propose to increase the size of the forces in the Caribbean with the new revenues. The assemblies of Jamaica and Antigua already paid high annual subsistence allowances for troops, while since the i66os Barbados and the Leeward Islands paid a 4.5% duty to the British government to cover the cost of imperial defense and administra- tion. I The Stamp Act thus required the islands to pay more for less toward an imperial tax that purported to subsidize defense.
Island and mainland colonies had similar objections to the Stamp Act.12
The islands traced their constitutional liberties from their first settlement.
They asserted that they enjoyed inherited and customary liberties common to all British subjects.13 Samuel Martin, a former speaker of the Antigua assembly and an outspoken critic of the Stamp Act, argued that these liberties had been defended against the Norman yoke and Stuart tyranny. They were enshrined in Magna Carta, the common law, and the revolutionary settlement of 1688.14 Henry Duke, solicitor general of Barbados, later recalled that the whole island had opposed the Stamp Act: "It was an Invasion, they said, of the constitutional Rights of English Subjects."15 In addition to appealing to the British Constitution, the Barbados assembly also cited the authority of the island's charter.16
Like mainland patriots, islanders maintained that taxes should be raised exclusively through their elected assemblies. The Barbados assembly had stated bluntly in 1740 that taxes "laid upon the inhabitants without the consent of their representatives" are invalid. Commons, the single member reported to have done so. His effort to obstruct the bill by a procedural motion received support only from "West Indian gentlemen and a few others connected with America."26 Absentee planters and merchants, along with island agents, campaigned against the bill. They initially hesitated to petition Parliament, knowing that parliamentary procedure disallowed petitions relating to money bills. When, however, they heard that the Treasury was claiming that "none of the colonies had any objection," they decided to petition the House of Commons as "a Monument of our unwillingness to submit to and our inability to bear such a burthern. 31 The rituals of the crowd are similar to those described in Peter Shaw, American
Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., i98i).
This content downloaded from 128.97.227.88 on Tue, 09 Jan 2018 02:22:11 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms not spontaneous but covertly organized; he was "greatly su not heard that even such a thing was intended: (so secret was the design kept)."32 Information is lacking about the identity of the local Sons of Liberty, as they were dubbed in the mainland press, and the participants in the mobs, although we know that the latter included Yankee sailors. The scale of the riots in St. Kitts suggests involvement of over half the free white adult male population. In other words, if contemporary estimates are accurate, these riots were proportionally equivalent to those of Boston and New York. The riot of October 31 began when a crowd of three to four hundred people gathered at about 8 P. M. at Noland's Tavern in Basseterre, the capital of St. Kitts. To the beat of a drum, they marched to the home of John Hopkins, a local merchant and the deputy of William Tuckett, the stamp distributor for St. Kitts and Nevis, where they shouted three huzzahs and demanded the stamp papers. When the stamps were turned over, they ceremoniously burned about "4 or 5 quires" of them at the door. After searching the house, they forced Hopkins to swear to have nothing further to do with the stamps and made him accompany them about three-quarters of a mile out of town to a house where Tuckett was recovering from a-fever.33 With drums still beating, the crowd seized Tuckett and returned with him on horseback to the public market. According to Tuckett's account, he was knocked to the ground when he dismounted and would have been murdered but for the help of "some Negroes" who knew him and rescued him "from the enraged Populace," allowing him to leave Basseterre.34 His escape was short-lived; the mob of "500 white People at least" came after him and made him walk back to town. Tuckett pleaded with their leaders for the sake of his weak health but was gibed with "gross insults" and obliged to resign his office. He promised to announce his resignation in the newspaper "to avoid being suspended," presumably by hanging. 35 After finishing with Tuckett, the mob rampaged through the streets of Basseterre to the office of the island secretary, Mr. Smith, where they broke in the door and burned another "four or five quires of stamped paper."36 They then walked Smith home "with great acclamations of huzzas" and went on to the office of the deputy provost marshal, where they burned "one quire" of stamps.37 Finally, they surrounded the custom house but were eventually persuaded to leave after the collector declared "over and over upon his word and honor" that he had no stamps inside.38 Disorder continued throughout the night with many "Violences and Disturbances," especially against supporters 32 William Tuckett to George Thomas, Dec. 5, 1765, CO/152/47, PRO. 33 Ibid; Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 6, 1765; Boston Post-Boy and Advertiser, Dec. 9, 1765. 34Tuckett to Thomas, Dec. 5, 1765, CO/152/47. 35 Ibid. 36Mass. Gaz., Dec. 6, 1765; Boston Post-Boy, Dec. 9, 1765. 37Mass. Gaz., Dec. 6, 1765; Boston Post-Boy, Dec. 9, 1765. 38Mass. Gaz., Dec. 6, 1765; Boston Post-Boy, Dec. 9, 1765. of the act who were subjected to "low and public Threats" and taunted with insulting language.39
During the night, Tuckett fled across the seven-mile channel from Basseterre to his native Nevis. There, he again began "to distribute those badges of slavery" on November 2, the day after the Stamp Act took effect.40 The St. Kitts "Sons of Liberty" followed him, and, joined by other supporters, resolved that they would by "some stratagem, get and burn, or tuck him up," but Tuckett escaped their clutches.41 In a trail of destruction, they burned two houses and hauled up a navy long boat that they loaded with stamps and "set the whole on fire."42
Violence did not subside in St. Kitts. "There is hardly a Man among them from the highest to the lowest," the Boston Gazette reported, "who does not openly show his hearty Abhorrence of the Stamp Law."43 On November 5, a crowd reassembled in Basseterre to parade effigies of the stamp master and his deputy that they burned in the common pasture. The evening concluded "with an elegant supper, Drums beating and the French Horns playing; and the last Toast was Liberty, Property and No Stamps."44 In late November, opponents of the act prevented a new supply of stamps from being landed and intercepted the correspondence of the stamp distributor. Tuckett still feared revenge and even assassination. He could find no one in St. Kitts willing to be his deputy or even to let a house to him.45 Defended by a small bodyguard, Tuckett reneged on his oath and clung to his office in Nevis, where he remained a figure of ridicule long beyond the repeal of the Stamp Act.46 After the riots, business continued as usual without the stamps, and no duties were collected. Ships cleared from both islands with unstamped papers.47 The governor offered a reward for information about the riots but met with no success.48
All the Leeward Islands successfully opposed the Stamp Act. Montserrat ignored the duties. Antigua, the unofficial seat of government in the Leewards, The presence in Antigua of both the governor of the Leeward Islands and the king's Sixty-eighth Regiment may explain why the inhabitants initially paid the duty, "though sorely against their wills."59 On the arrival of the stamp papers, Governor Thomas promptly ordered two sentries to guard the home of the stamp distributor and commanded a hundred regulars to protect the stamp papers. The governor observed in December "a general uneasiness and discon- The legislatures of the Leeward Islands also opposed the Stamp Act. In St. Kitts, the merchants who composed a joint committee of the legislature appointed to investigate the riots failed to take any action. The St. Kitts assembly refused to join the council in another committee of investigation in January and instead suggested that they should draw up a joint address to the king representing "the Extreme grievances and heavy burthern of the Stamp Act in order if possible to obtain a repeal."66 In Nevis, the legislature feigned abhorrence at the tumults, but private letters of council member John Pinney reveal "rather a somewhat guarded exultation."67 In Antigua, the assembly rejected a land warrant and petition that had been submitted on stamped paper. In December I765, for reasons that will become apparent, the joint legislature of the island resolved to petition the king for repeal. 68 The disturbances in St. Kitts and Nevis were unequaled elsewhere in the British Caribbean. Barbados and Jamaica complied with the Stamp Act. Stamp officials there, unlike the majority of distributors on the mainland, never resigned. Barbados shared the general grievances against the Stamp Act. There were "loud complaints" in Barbados against the West Indian members of Parliament for failing to be more vocal in their opposition.69 In November I765, the assembly complained to Governor Charles Pinfold of the irregular nature of the tax and cited its compliance with British requests during the last war.70 In December, the lower house resolved to send a joint remonstrance to the king. The agent for Barbados warned Rockingham that "Peaceable as we are, Distress will make us desperate-Barbados will be in confusion like Boston. "71 The following January, the lower house accepted a council propos to send a joint address to its London agent to be communicated to the government.72 By the time of the repeal of the Stamp Act, Pinfold thought the island "ripe for Disturbances."73 There was talk in the assembly of voting no local taxes for the support of government, including the governor's salary, and of reducing sugar exports to Britain.74
Despite sympathy with the general opposition to the Stamp Act, Barbados complied with its enforcement. So great was the demand for stamps that the distributors feared their supply would run out.75 The Barbados Mercury and the Barbados Gazette were printed on stamped paper.76 In Philadelphia, a stamped Barbadian newspaper was brought out one evening in "the Coffee House," where it was "handcuffed" by an iron chain and triumphantly burned to loud cheers.77 The Barbados Mercury printed a tirade from one planter to a correspondent in Philadelphia warning that the North Americans were "not of such Consequence, that your vain Threats shall oblige us to throw off that Duty that we owe to our Sovereign, and join with a Sett of Men, who, under the specious Name of Asserters of their Liberty, dare, contrary to all Laws human and divine, break out into the most outrageous Acts of Rebellion against their Sovereign Defender." The writer vowed that no hardship, however extreme, would "lessen in us that loyal Attachment we have to Perform of our most gracious sovereign, or that tender Regard we bear our Mother Country."78 The governor of Barbados reported that all was "quiet and easy" and that the act was "obeyed with . The assembly of Barbados, the oldest representative body in the Caribbean, bowed to the objections of the council and refrained from petitioning the king in December. The following January it compromised on a joint letter to its agent in London. An adulterated copy of the letter, probably originating in the island and circulated in print on the mainland, condemned "the present rebellious opposition given to authority" by the North Americans-for which John Dickinson of Philadelphia reproached the assembly in an anonymous pamphlet.81 The Barbados assembly and its apologists vainly protested that (incorrect copies had been sent abroad" and that the offensive clause was not in the official draft.82 As one of the members astutely observed, it was not simply the clause that angered Dickinson, "but the obedience yielded by them to the lawful Authority of our Mother Country, in a case where they might have been tempted by a very notable Example of Resistance."83 On the repeal of the Stamp Act, Barbados "did not show the least sign of rejoicing ... on that glorious occasion."84 Jamaicans made only nominal opposition to the Stamp Act. They were already displeased with George Grenville's policies following the closure of the Spanish bullion trade and thus potentially sensitive to any changes in imperial policy. They made "repeated Threats of Violence, Torrents of Personal abuse and many other very disagreeable Circumstances" against the stamp distributor, John Howell. Howell believed that only the speedy removal of the stamps to a safe place in Spanish Town, the capital of Jamaica, saved the stamp office because the people found the duties so "obnoxious."85 Jamaicans did not use stamps on the probate of wills. The deeds in the Court of Ordinary in Spanish Town show that many people rushed to complete business before the stamp duty came into force; many deferred their legal business until its repeal, and others evaded it.86 By the beginning of 1766, North American ships were clearing Port Royal without stamped papers. Following repeal, the islanders burned effigies of Howell and Grenville.87
For all its token resistance, Jamaica paid more stamp duty than the rest of the empire in toto, amounting to over ?2,000 sterling during the four and a half months the act was in force.88 Howell believed that the revenue would The obedience of Jamaica and Barbados seems surprising. Their advantages over the Leewards made gestures of defiance against imperial authority more feasible. Jamaica and Barbados possessed a lower proportion of slaves-a potentially restraining influence on violence within the white communitythan the Leeward Islands. They contained larger white populations than the Leewards, which, in contrast to the latter's decline, increased between 171o and 1770.94 They boasted legislatures jealous of their privileges and more assertive than many mainland assemblies in the first half of the eighteenth century.95
They exhibited no more dependence on Britain than the Leeward Islands. Barbados especially had no history of slave rebellions, no regiments of British soldiers, a lower rate of absentee ownership, and the highest proportion of white settlers anywhere in the British Caribbean. paper is obnoxious to them and will operate to us a prohibition."109 The islands were in effect subjected to a blockade until they joined the mainland's opposition to the stamp duties.
Repercussions in the Leeward Islands were immediate. By the end of 1765, the cessation of provisions and lumber from North America threatened Antigua with famine. Samuel Martin wrote that the Stamp Act had driven the Americans into French ports and that planters had no casks to ship sugar to England. Another Antiguan planter wrote that the island was in imminent danger of being ruined because submission to the Stamp Act had reaped the wrath of the North Americans.110 A couple of days later, a local trader warned that without the northward trade "the estates can never be supported." He feared that if conditions continued, "we are likely to be Miserably off for want of lumber and Northern Provisions as the North Americans are determined not to submit to the Stamp Act .... The Islands (nay the Merchants in England as our Remittances principally center there) will feel the Effects severely, for there is not one tenth of the lumber in the Islands that will be required for the next crop. "111 Beeston Long testified before a committee of the House of Commons in February I766 that Antigua faced starvation and ruin.112
The Leeward Islands yielded to the economic pressure of the North Americans. The inhabitants of Antigua rose against the stamp distributor when the captains of two ships from New York threatened to leave because their "orders were not to sell at any Island where the Stampt Papers were used," a proscription that the Massachusetts Gazette hoped would be followed by owners of all vessels bound for the West Indies.113 In addition to northern economic pressure, the presence of Yankee sailors may also explain events in St. Kitts and Nevis. According to several contemporary accounts, the particularly violent disturbances in St. Kitts and Nevis were fomented by the crews of New England vessels lying off St. Kitts, who "behaved like young lions" during the riots.114
The unique administrative structure of the Leeward Islands also partially explains their successful opposition to the Stamp Act. The most scattered and loose-knit federal colony in the empire, the Leewards had four deputy governors, four councils, and four assemblies (a fifth, in Tortola, was added in I774). As Governor Sir Ralph Payne noted some years later, "The government is divided into an Archipelago of Islands extending between two and three hundred miles . . . which have distinct legislatures and laws, and in fact Governments independent of each other, although under one General and Chief Commander, it is perfectly impracticable to carry on the very laborious Business of my Government, without a ready and easy communication with every District of it."115 The governors, usually based in Antigua, had to hire vessels at their own expense to visit the other islands., Payne was the first to tour all the Leewards in 1773. Local planters, rather than outside worthies, often held the governorship owing to the unprofitability of the post. Deputy governors on each island theoretically aided the governor, but they lived in England.116 In practice, the presidents of the councils governed each island.
This dilution of authority severely undermined executive power in the Leewards. 1 17
Poor communication among the islands was another impediment to executive control. "The distance of the several Islands of my Government," according to Governor George Thomas, "necessarily created delays." Thomas blamed these distances for his failure to reply to the earl of Halifax's circular letter announcing the Stamp Act until after a year had elapsed.118 He claimed that he was not even aware of Tuckett's appointment as stamp distributor in St. stamps by the end of I765 and claimed that they were unaware of the act, although two Philadelphian merchants had heard in November that they threatened to burn them. In Tortola, at the outermost edge of the colony, there was no stamp master or stamp consignment as late as January 1766. 120 The failure of Thomas, a former governor of Pennsylvania who was a native of Antigua, to take effective action also contributed to successful resistance in The high rate of absenteeism among St. Kitts and Nevis planters may well have weakened the potential restraining influence of a local elite. Absenteeism was still quite rare in Nevis in the I730s, when the Reverend Robert Robertson observed that the majority of planters were unable to live abroad, but by 1745 absentee planters owned half the property in St. Kitts. The diarist Janet Schaw, visiting the island in 1775, found it "almost abandoned to overseers and managers, owing to the amazing fortunes that belong to Individuals, who almost all reside in England."124 The proportion of land owned by absentees in these islands far exceeded that of resident planters by the time of the Stamp Act.
Historians cite exceptional local circumstances to explain Jamaica's lack of opposition to the Stamp Act. The Jamaican assembly, prorogued for most of the period by Governor William Henry Lyttelton, could not respond to the stamp duties. Before the advent of the Stamp Act, Jamaicans sought Lyttelton's recall, and their energies were engaged in a bitter struggle with th governor. 125 In addition, they were already accustomed to paying stamp dutie under local laws to subsidize new defenses in the wake of the slave rebellion of i760.126 The stature and personality of the stamp distributor, John Howell, also promoted the successful enforcement of the duties. He was not a native of the region in contrast to all the other stamp distributors except Georgia's. He enjoyed close court connections through a German brother-in-law who was confidant of George III. Howell was provost marshal of Jamaica, which gave him greater powers of arrest than his fellow stamp distributors. His office in Spanish Town was situated seventeen miles from the merchant community of Kingston, where opposition would most likely be centered.127 Finally, the outbreak of a slave rebellion in Jamaica at the end of November I765 diverted potential resistance.
Such explanations beg questions. Why should a dispute with the governor prevent Jamaicans from also attacking the Stamp Act? Why did Jamaicans fail to set up extralegal conventions or committees when the governor closed the assembly? The existence of earlier local stamp acts in Jamaica has little explanatory power. Massachusetts introduced local stamp laws in the same period but fiercely resisted the imperial duty. The local stamp duties in Jamaica differed from the new imperial duties in important respects, and, furthermore, they were levied by the planters' own representatives. 128 Local popularity did not save stamp distributors on the mainland from verbal and physical abuse. The slave rebellion of I765 broke out,"prematurely" a month after the enforcement of the stamp duties and was quickly suppressed. 129 The fear of slave revolt, especially in Jamaica, may well explain the unwillingness of whites to riot, but it does not explain their failure to develop other strategies of opposition. The local constitutional struggles in Jamaica demonstrate that the planters were usually very capable of defendin gating local factors in Jamaica did not exist in Barbados, which nevertheless acquiesced in collecting stamp duties. The passivity of Barbados is all the more striking because it was the most truculent of the British islands in its relations with imperial government during the American Revolution.130
By concentrating on local conditions to explain the reactions of Jamaica and Barbados, the essential point-that the Leeward Islands were abnormal in the virulence of their opposition-is lost. Jamaica and Barbados typified the natural inclination of the islands toward conciliation, which became more pronounced in the build up to the Revolutionary War. Even taking the opposition of the Leeward Islands into account, the reaction of all the islands differed in important respects from that of the mainland colonies during the crisis of the I765-I766.
The island colonies in general exhibited less strident opposition than their mainland counterparts. In petitions and memorials to Britain, island legislatures and agents did not formally articulate the constitutional principles on which they opposed the act. They preferred instead to emphasize commercial and practical objections. Fuller's timid formula, circumventing reference to rights and principles, was adopted in the petition of the Antigua legislature.'34 The committee of correspondence of the Barbados assembly instructed its agent to draw up a petition that avoided anything "in the stile and substance of that Representation that might give offence to those from whom only our Redress can come."135 Indeed, not only was it left to the discretion of agent whether to introduce the question of principles, but the committee actually admitted that it was uncertain of the constitutional legitimacy of its case: "How far, indeed, we are intitled, by the constitution of England, or our own peculiar character, to an exemption from every other internal tax, than such as may be laid upon us by the representatives of our own people, in conjunction with the two other branches of our legislative body, we can not positively say." The committee preferred to seek repeal by a "humble submission to authority."136 As late as I77I, a member of the Barbados assembly was willing to argue that the Stamp Act was "impracticable and inexpedient" but constitutionally legitimate.137 The sentiments of the Barbados assembly differed so widely from those of the mainland colonies that Dickinson wrote that the latter would "rather die" than set such a precedent for perpetual servility.'38
Dickinson's criticism roused three Barbadians to defend the assembly. The replies, although representing a variety of views, indicate the gulf between the island and mainland colonies. Kenneth Morrison, an Anglican clergyman, came close to advocating obedience to any parliamentary ruling; Alleyne, an admirer of Boston radical James Otis and later speaker of the assembly, prided Barbados on its pragmatic and prudent response, and an anonymous writer, posing as a mediator between Morrison and Dickinson, criticized British parliamentary power and advocated parliamentary reform. 139 All three condemned the injustice of the Stamp Act; even Morrison thought it detestable.140 Yet, despite their different stances, they all emphasized that the act was passed with the authority of "legal garb" and was therefore entitled to respect.14' They distrusted Dickinson's "zeal for natural rights."'142 Alleyne charged that the real crime of the committee in the eyes of Dickinson was its appeal to authorities other than the laws of nature.143 He mischievously quipped that, "in such a well cleared and little spot," it was impossible for the assembly to appeal to the laws of nature with "no woods, no BackSettlements to retreat to."1144 Morrison and Alleyne accused "the North American" of advocating violence and bloodshed.145 All three authors expressed shock at the behavior of the patriotic mobs in America and defended the moderation of Barbados.146 At the same time, they absolved the island of the "Jacobitical Taint" of extreme passive obedience.147 Morrison and Alleyne could not resist commenting on the irony that the North Americans were celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act although Parliament had failed to acknowledge the right of the colonists to tax themselves and had specifically asserted its own right to legislate in all cases whatsoever in the Declaratory Act. 148
The conciliatory response of Jamaica and Barbados was anathema to the mainland Sons of Liberty. To pay any stamp duty appeared to the mainland patriots to be both a tacit acknowledgment of Parliament's authority to tax the colonies and a fatal precedent for the future. Further, it broke the united front that they held necessary to defeat the tax. The reaction of Jamaica and Barbados paralleled that of mainland loyalists like Thomas Hutchinson who, although privately disliking the Stamp Act, believed that the act should be obeyed until the wisdom of imperial government brought about its repeal.
No radical leader, like Samuel Adams or Patrick Henry, who rose to prominence through opposition to the Stamp Act, emerged in the islands. Samuel Martin, the most outspoken critic in Antigua, became an opponent of the American Revolution. Alleyne, the popular speaker of the Barbados assembly after I767 and the aggressive champion of assembly rights, voted against sending a memorial to the king about the Stamp Act. He sat on the assembly's committee of correspondence and defended Barbados in reply to Dickinson. The island assemblies, even in St. Kitts and Nevis, showed little initiative during the crisis. Unlike the mainland colonies, they passed no resolutions defining colonial rights. They made no attempt at federation like the Stamp Act Congress. No formal organizations or committees existed outside St. Kitts and Nevis. They made no appeal to homespun or any attempt to limit trade with nonimportation agreements. They did not denounce luxury and corruption in Britain. To the disgust of Isaiah Thomas, the radical New muter still in their response to the Townshend duties (I767). On that occasion, the islands sent no petitions to Britain and formed no nonimportation associations. They made no attempt to coordinate or to set up committees of correspondence. The November I765 Stamp Act riots in St. Kitts and Nevis belie the notion that the whites of the British Caribbean were incapable of even token opposition to imperial policy. These riots were major in proportion to the size of the free population. They occurred despite the dependence of these islands on the British sugar market, despite the highest proportion of slaves in British America, and despite a powerful military presence in the region. The later failure of the British Caribbean to support the American Revolution was not simply a response to the threat of military coercion or to the impracticality of a revolt. It reflected fundamental differences between the development of the island and mainland colonies that were apparent during the Stamp Act crisis.156 156 The loyalty of the islands during the American Revolution is the subject of O'Shaughnessy, Patriots and Creoles: The American Revolution and British Caribbean (forthcoming), which seeks to explain the islands' divergence from the mainland colonies.
